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ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday 29 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

(Mexico)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. J. LENGIETL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO
Mr. P.M. GEORGE

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. STAWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. L.I. MENDELEVITCH
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M.H. El-ZAYYAT
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN
Mr. H.B. MOULTON

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the seventy-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): At our seventy-fifth plenary meeting, on 27 August, my delegation and that of the United Kingdom, on behalf of our two Governments, tabled two draft treaties dealing with the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Those draft treaties have now been circulated as conference documents, the one banning tests in all environments as document ENDC/58, and the one banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water as document ENDC/59.

Yesterday we held the twenty-fourth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, at which those treaty drafts were discussed. The verbatim record of that meeting (ENDC/SC.I/PV.24) is available to all delegations this morning. It was agreed that the date of the next meeting of the Sub-Committee should be set by consultation between its members and the incoming Chairman.

While members of the full Committee are undertaking the study of our draft treaties and of the verbatim records of the seventy-fifth plenary meeting and the twenty-fourth meeting of the test ban Sub-Committee my delegation intends to proceed today with its discussion of agenda topic number 5(c) (ENDC/52) on the reduction of conventional armaments.

This morning my delegation presents the second part of the statement of the United States delegation regarding its position on the reduction of conventional armaments, which complements the remarks made by Mr. Dean on 24 August (ENDC/PV.74, pp.42 et seq.). In it we propose to discuss two other important aspects of the question of the reduction of conventional armaments -- limitations on the production of such arms, and the problems connected with the verification of the reduction and limitations on production.

The first major point is the limitation on the production of conventional armaments, as well as other armaments, under the United States and Soviet draft proposals. In this context it is desirable that the Committee fully understand the significant differences existing between the two proposals, as well as what my Government believes to be the soundness of the United States proposal.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

In brief review, the Committee will recall that the United States submitted at our meeting on 6 August important changes (ENDC/30/Add.2) to its outline proposal affecting production of all major armaments during stage I.

First of all, the United States has specified in its draft treaty outline (ENDC/30 and Add.2) that production of new types of all armaments, including conventional armaments, will be entirely prohibited during stage I and for all time thereafter. That means of course a definite freezing of the arms development of all nations at a given point in time and represents a most significant step toward halting the arms race.

Secondly, all production of armaments subject to reduction during stage I will be limited to the replacement of any unit within each type by a unit of the same type. In this respect my Government has proposed that any unit of armament turned in for a new unit produced in an authorized manner must not come from "junked" or "cannibalized" reserves. Mr. Zorin, as well as Mr. Kuznetsov, has expressed agreement with us on this point: I refer representatives to documents ENDC/PV.68, page 21, and ENDC/PV.75, page 49.

Under our proposal, for illustrative purposes, a Soviet T-54 tank could replace another T-54 tank, but in no instance could a Soviet T-54 tank be replaced by a modern Soviet T-10 tank or, let us say, could a United States M-48 medium tank be replaced by a larger and more advanced M-60 tank. Furthermore, a conventionally powered cruiser could not be replaced by a nuclear powered guided missile cruiser; nor could a conventional submarine be replaced by a nuclear powered ballistic missile launching submarine. The United States proposal is explicit on this issue. Further, in no instance would the production of a specific type of armament be permitted to negate the requirement to effect a net reduction of 10 per cent in numbers by type in each step, so that the resulting 30 per cent reduction in stage I would be assured.

Furthermore, my delegation has expressed its willingness to discuss exact limitations, that is to say, a ceiling on the amount of production of each type to be allowed even on the basis of one-for-one replacement. We believe it is essential that some absolute limitation on the amount of this production during any one year be agreed to by all parties to the treaty.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The third point bearing on production during stage I under our plan is the proviso that the testing and production of new types of armaments would be prohibited, although, in accordance with agreed annual quotas, States would be allowed flight tests of missiles. My Government believes that one of the most effective and essential ways of halting the arms race and ensuring the freezing of the arms mix at an agreed point in time is sharply to limit the opportunities for qualitative upgrading of permitted armaments retained by States parties to the treaty.

The fourth and final point in our proposal would require the placing of strict limitations on the expansion of all production facilities declared by parties upon entry into force of the treaty. Thus the construction of new plant facilities for the production of any of the armaments reduced or of any new kinds of armaments would be prohibited, and even the construction of stand-by armament plants in which no production was contemplated would be forbidden. Only those plants already producing armaments could continue production, and even then only within agreed limits permitted by the treaty.

As a corollary to the above points the United States believes that during stage I arrangements will have to be negotiated concerning the production of spare parts to replace parts of armaments that may become unusable or non-serviceable. It is perfectly clear that those provisions would apply equally to all armaments, whether they were conventional or nuclear capable. It will be recalled too that under the provisions of the United States draft outline the production of all armaments of any kind would cease at the start of stage II of the treaty. My delegation has already stated that it believes that our new proposal on production represents one of the most significant and forthcoming changes as regards general and complete disarmament yet presented to this Committee.

The Committee will remember that at the time the Soviet Union accepted the principle of percentage reduction of conventional armaments (ENDC/2/Add.1) it did not make corresponding changes in its proposal on the production of conventional armaments. In fact, the Soviet draft treaty, as regards both stage I and stage II, merely specifies that the production of conventional weapons would be limited in some unknown relation to the reduction of force levels. We submit that language of that kind is all too characteristic of the vagueness and imprecision with which in other respects the Soviet treaty is written. Permit me to make several observations in this regard.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The provision in the present Soviet draft treaty permitting an undetermined amount of production of conventional armaments at least into stage III of a treaty would inevitably promote the continuation of the arms race that we all seek to end. In that respect the Soviet plan is apparently contradictory. It calls for the complete elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles during stage I, on the basis of the unsubstantiated assertion in the Soviet proposal that such a measure would end the threat of nuclear war. While the United States of course believes that nuclear war would be a great catastrophe for mankind, we must keep in mind the fact that conventional war can also bring great destruction and human suffering. We must therefore direct our efforts to reducing the possibility of all kinds of war. However, the present Soviet proposal in document ENDC/2, by permitting an indeterminate but substantial amount of production of both new and existing types of conventional armaments during all stages of a treaty, would perpetuate the arms race. If Mr. Kuznetsov was serious when he said on 27 August that the Soviet Union, like the United States, was against any re-equipping with new types of conventional armaments (ENDC/PV.75, p.47), then we believe that the Soviet draft treaty should be amended accordingly to prohibit the production of new types.

During the course of his remarks on that occasion, Mr. Kuznetsov contended that the presentation to this Committee of lists of weapons by types would be premature in connexion with stage I, and he said furthermore that it was a relatively simple matter for experts using certain equipment to determine to everyone's satisfaction whether an armament was conventional or nuclear capable (Ibid., p.40). Once again we must say to the Soviet delegation that the problem of distinguishing clearly what is a nuclear delivery vehicle and what is a purely conventional weapon cannot be dismissed so easily as a minor, so-called technical issue.

For example, we submit that Mr. Kuznetsov confused matters when he said:

"Our military experts consider that there is no difficulty in determining the type of aircraft unsuitable for the combat use of nuclear weapons, such as, for instance, anti-aircraft defence fighter planes, military transport planes, communications aircraft and helicopters and aircraft used for initial training, irrespective of their airborne weight." (Ibid., pp.40-41)

Mr. Kuznetsov continued:

"Surface warships and ships that cannot be adapted for the combat use of nuclear weapons should be regarded as conventional weapons, whereas all submarines without exception can be used for delivering nuclear weapons to their targets and therefore should all be subject to destruction in the first stage."

(ibid., p. 41)

The precise point my delegation has been trying to make is that even though certain types of armaments may not have been designed originally to carry or fire both nuclear and conventional weapons the simple fact is that most, if not all, of the vehicles enumerated by Mr. Kuznetsov in his remarks quoted above are readily adaptable to carry or fire either nuclear or conventional weapons. The only problem with that group of armaments is to develop a suitable nuclear warhead, and in many cases that would not pose great problems. It simply is not clear to my delegation why, for example, the Soviet Union asserts that all submarines are capable of carrying nuclear weapons and, under its plan, must be completely destroyed during stage I, whereas it does not believe that most fighter aircraft, ships, helicopters, military transport planes and other planes are also adaptable to the carrying of nuclear weapons. The same is true of the items enumerated by Mr. Kuznetsov as conventional armaments -- such as tanks, self-propelled artillery, armoured vehicles, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, various rocket-firing guns and many types of artillery -- which can all be put into the class of potential delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons.

We can by no means leave these possibilities out of the picture, and it is for that reason that we insist that a thorough implementation of the Soviet proposal for 100 per cent elimination of all potential delivery vehicles in stage I would amount to a requirement to complete the great bulk of general disarmament in the first stage. To impose such a colossal task for stage I is of course totally unreasonable, and contradicts our understanding that disarmament is to proceed by meaningful stages. The United States plan for an across-the-board reduction of 30 per cent avoids that pitfall and also removes the need for trying to work out any list differentiating between conventional weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles.

(Mr. Stelle. United States)

For the reasons we have explained we are very doubtful whether it would be possible to draw up such a list without involving ourselves in great controversy, despite Mr. Kuznetsov's assurances to the contrary. That is why we still believe that it would be extremely useful to this Committee if the Soviet Union would produce at least an illustrative list of types of armaments, to be used as a basis for our discussion in determining to the satisfaction of all of us which are purely nuclear delivery vehicles and which are distinctly conventional.

It was a matter of regret to my delegation that Mr. Zorin failed to come forward with any substantial comments on our new proposals affecting the production of new and existing armaments during stage I (ENDC/30/Add.1) when they were presented during our sixty-sixth meeting. Unfortunately, in the light of the remarks made by Mr. Kuznetsov during the seventy-fourth and seventy-fifth meetings, there appears to be either a serious misunderstanding of our proposals or a desire on the part of the Soviet delegation to confuse the real purport of these proposals.

In particular, I should like to quote at some length from Mr. Kuznetsov's remarks at our last meeting on 27 August. He said:

"Let us try and imagine what situation would come about in practice, if the United States proposal -- that so-called less effective armaments would not be subject to reduction or to any limitation whatsoever in stage I -- were adopted. While peace-loving countries would be honestly fulfilling their obligation to reduce delivery vehicles by 100 per cent and certain types of conventional armaments by 30 per cent," -- I repeat, "to reduce delivery vehicles by 100 per cent and certain types of conventional armaments by 30 per cent" -- "a potential aggressor would be able to switch his military production to the mass production of those planes and warships which are not subject to reduction in the first stage, as well as mortars, machine guns and other types of light arms, and to accumulate them in superior quantities, thereby gaining a military advantage over peace-loving States." (ENDC/PV.75, p. 1)

It is perfectly clear from Mr. Kuznetsov's words that in one breath he is discussing the United States outline proposal, while in the very next breath he has tailored the United States proposal for the reduction of armaments by 30 per cent across the board during stage I to the Soviet proposal calling for the complete elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles. He then goes on to argue that permitted stage I production of those armaments first dealt with in stage II of the

United States outline plan, and therefore not subject to reduction or production limitations during stage I, would permit the Western Powers to gain unilateral advantages over the Soviet Union and its allies, who were fulfilling their obligations -- under the Soviet, but not under the Western scheme of things -- by eliminating 100 per cent of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and 30 per cent of their conventional weapons. I do not need to pursue this kind of reasoning further to point out clearly that very little progress can be achieved in this Committee unless all of us endeavour to discuss each proposal separately and distinctly with no other intent in mind than to broaden our perspectives and seek enlightenment.

Permit me to speak briefly to the Soviet criticism (ibid., p.42) of the United States outline proposal which excludes lesser armaments from reduction and from certain production limitations during stage I. In this connexion Mr. Kuznetsov did little to help us with respect to my delegation's previous statements that we have approached the problem primarily from the viewpoint of feasibility of stage I verification when he said: "... this is a flimsy and artificial argument." He went on to assert that the problem of organizing the international disarmament organization and controlling the reduction of all types of conventional armaments from the first stage is quite feasible. Well, if that is so, then Mr. Kuznetsov should tell this Committee in detail at a subsequent meeting precisely how he envisages that this can be done, considering the great size of the stockpiles and the retained levels.

My delegation has absolutely no objection to a discussion of which armaments ought to be considered for reduction and production limitations during stage I. Our position is not inflexible and we are prepared to consider the soundness of any such measures as may be proposed.

In summary, the Soviet Union and ourselves now appear to be much more closely in agreement that strict limitations would be placed on the production of conventional armaments during stage I, based on the necessary replacement of armaments normally going out of commission each year (ibid., p.47). There is also agreement that during stage II broader measures would be required. My delegation hopes that the Soviet delegation will clarify what it means by strictly limited production during stage I. Does it mean reduced production of armaments in relation to reduction of forces, and

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

therefore something of the order of 50 per cent for the Soviet Union? Does the Soviet Union mean, as we have already asked, to prohibit the production of all new types of armaments from the outset of stage I and to permit only agreed replacement by type of existing armaments? Does the Soviet Union envisage production limitations during any given year on replacements of units within existing types as well, as is specified in our proposal? My delegation hopes that the Soviet Union will soon provide answers in detail to this Committee.

A second area of agreement with the Soviet Union appears to be on the question of banning the construction and expansion of new arms production facilities during stage I. On this issue the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States appear to be very similar although, here again, Mr. Kuznetsov's remarks at the seventy-fifth meeting are not as yet reflected in the language of the Soviet plan.

I should like to turn now to the problem of verifying the reduction of all armaments, including conventional arms. As we have stated before, it is clear that there are three major areas of any disarmament agreement which will require appropriate verification.

First is the verification of arms destroyed. Apparently the Soviet Union, from what Mr. Kuznetsov stated at the seventy-fifth meeting, is in general agreement on the steps proposed by the United States to accomplish this.

To recapitulate briefly, the inventories of armaments of various types scheduled for reduction in stage I would be declared to the international disarmament organization at the beginning of the stage. Designated quantities of armaments corresponding to the agreed percentages to be destroyed would be placed in agreed international disarmament organization depots. The international disarmament organization would ensure that the equipment and armaments were in good working order. After sequestration the international disarmament organization would destroy or supervise the conversion to peaceful purposes of the armaments. We will have to work out criteria for conversion to peaceful purposes of armaments which would prevent a quick reconversion of non-military vehicles, facilities or pieces of equipment to a militarily useful condition.

The second area concerns the verification necessary to ensure that the provisions for limiting stage I production are adhered to. Here, I believe, there is a marked divergence between the Soviet and United States approaches which has never been adequately brought to light.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Under the United States plan, inspectors of the international disarmament organization would be stationed at all declared plants to ensure that production of existing types of armaments did not exceed agreed annual limitations, and that the production of each unit of an existing type was carefully recorded to make certain that, under the one-for-one replacement arrangement, a unit of a similar type was removed from the arsenal of the particular country. In addition, the inspectors would see to it that no production of new types of armaments was allowed to begin.

Under the Soviet plan, inspectors of the international disarmament organization would be permitted to survey only those plants or parts of plants which were designated for total liquidation during stage I. This is made clear by Mr. Kuznetsov's remarks on 27 August (ibid., p.49). There would be no control whatsoever over factories which might or might not be declared, since the Soviet Union is unclear on this point, but which would be left untouched by Soviet stage I liquidation commitments. The glaring inadequacies of this scheme would make a mockery of control. There would be no way whatsoever of verifying either the quantity or the quality of the continuing production at remaining facilities. There would be no method for determining whether new types of armaments were being manufactured or whether the one-for-one replacement rule was being observed.

The problems of the third area of verification are equally great. The function of this area of verification is to assure that remaining quantities of arms do not exceed the agreed levels at each step and at each stage of the disarmament process. This involves several major factors.

First, States must be assured that the numbers of armaments destroyed constitute the specified percentages of their original inventories of arms. The United States has illustrated how some assurance might be given through zonal inspection. Up to now the Soviet Union has given us no indication of how it would give such assurances.

Secondly, States must be assured that no new production facilities are constructed or that clandestine production is not taking place at undeclared facilities. As my delegation has spelled out, the United States illustrative proposals on progressive zonal inspection had been devised to provide an adequate degree of assurance that those prohibited types of activity were not carried out.

I hope that further clarification of Soviet proposals will be forthcoming from the Soviet delegation and that that will help us to enlarge the present areas of agreement in the field of conventional armaments. For our part, we are prepared to respond to any serious and straightforward questions which the Soviet delegation may wish to ask about our proposals.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation would like to set forth its views on the two documents submitted to the consideration of the Committee on 27 August by the United States and the United Kingdom delegations, relating to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. One document (ENDC/58) has the title "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments"; the second document (ENDC/59) has the title "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water."

If we take the United States' position on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and try to discover whether there has been any change in this position during all the years of negotiations, it becomes obvious that the gist of this position remained, and still remains, unchanged. What is the gist of this position? The gist is that the United States constantly puts forward one and the same demand, no matter what form of words and proposals it is clothed in at various stages in the negotiations: either there will be no cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the nuclear weapons race will continue in a mounting spiral, or else the Soviet Union, as the price for the cessation of tests, must lay open to the Western Powers and the military NATO bloc its system of national defence in the circumstances where the Western countries do not hide the fact that they are carrying out preparations for a nuclear war against the peace-loving States.

This purpose underlay the Western proposals of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9) and it has not changed since that date. Every time it becomes evident to the United States that it can no longer defend its position on the cessation of tests with its old methods, fresh attempts are made to give this position a slightly renovated look: they touch it up and give it a little grooming. Everything is done as in the case of an ugly old maid, whom the despairing parents every year deck out in a more fashionable dress to hide her ugliness, put an ever thicker layer of powder and paint on her face and show her off to prospective husbands in this guise. But the would-be bride remains as she was, the only difference is that she gets older every year.

It will now be out of place to look once more at what has happened to the United States position on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests during the negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the Three-Power Sub-Committee. The United States began by boosting here its proposals of 18 April 1961, which were based on unacceptable demands for the establishment of a cumbersome international control system, with obligatory inspection and the right to penetrate

without hindrance into the most secret places in the territories of States, etc. It was evident from the very beginning of the negotiations that these proposals could not serve as a basis for an agreement and that the demands for obligatory on-site inspection contained therein were not justified by any necessity.

After the submission on 16 April 1962 of the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers (ENDC/28), which contains a compromise proposal for the solution of the problem of putting an end to tests, the United States realised that it could only make its position worse if it continued to insist on its old proposals in their previous form. It is true that the United States continued for some time to insist on these proposals and rejected outright those of the eight Powers. However, it soon became convinced that it was not possible to maintain this position for long. Then it was stated that the United States was prepared to accept the eight-Power memorandum as "one of the bases for negotiations."

On 6 August the United States submitted its so-called new proposals. Everything possible was done to advertise these "new" proposals. Mr. Dean assured us then that the United States was making great changes in its earlier position on the question of the cessation of tests. And what did they turn out to be upon examination? They were merely a new dress on the ugly old maid. There was nothing qualitatively new in these "new" proposals of the United States. Basically they contained, as before, a demand for obligatory international on-site inspection and the establishment of a network of control posts under international supervision, and so forth and so on.

It did not take long to come to the conclusion that the so-called "new" United States proposals were the same old 1961 proposals, and even earlier proposals re-hashed in a different form. The United States failed this time also to undermine with these proposals the importance of the eight-Power memorandum as the most realistic basis in the existing circumstances for the solution of the problem of putting an end to all tests. The eight-Power memorandum remained the focal point in our negotiations.

Now we have before us a so-called "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments", submitted by the United States and United Kingdom delegations for the consideration of our Committee on 27 August. What sort of document is this? Once more we are being told that these are new proposals. The whole huge propaganda machine of the Western Powers, and Western statesmen, including those of the highest rank, are trying with all their might to convince public opinion to take these latest "new" proposals for something they are not in fact. If we listened to Mr. Dean

we would believe that this is almost a concrete statement in treaty language of the provisions contained in the eight-Power memorandum. Mr. Dean said at our meeting on 27 August that these proposals

"take into account constructive suggestions by the eight new members of this Conference, including those contained in their memorandum of 16 April (ENDC/28). A reading of the text of the comprehensive treaty now laid before the Committee will show the serious extent to which those suggestions of the eight new members have been taken into account." (ENDC/PV.75, p.6)

We have read this text, and made an effort to discover the points it has in common with the eight-Power memorandum about which Mr. Dean spoke so solemnly. We have also compared the provisions of this draft treaty with those of the earlier draft submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on 18 April 1961. We should now like to report to the Committee on the results of these comparisons.

Let us begin with the question of inspection. An integral part of the draft treaty submitted by the United States and United Kingdom last year was the principle of obligatory on-site inspection, although there was in fact no need for such inspection. Obligatory on-site inspection is an integral part also of the new draft. Secondly, on the question of inspection, the United States and the United Kingdom have not moved towards the provisions of the memorandum of the non-aligned States. They have not agreed to accept one of the basic provisions of that memorandum, namely, the provision that verification in loco may be carried out only at the invitation of the State on whose territory an unidentified and significant event has taken place.

Let us turn now to the question of the system of control posts for supervising compliance by States with their obligation not to carry out nuclear tests. The old proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom were based on the aim to establish an extensive system of international control posts on the territories of all States, under cover of which the NATO intelligence service could work. And what do the United States and the United Kingdom now propose? Essentially a similar international system, the main element of which would be observation stations set up under a centralized system, with international observers in them, who would also be appointed by the international commission. The eight-Power memorandum, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that observation should be carried out by means of existing national stations for the detection of nuclear explosions. Consequently,

the United States and the United Kingdom have not accepted this important provision of the eight-Power memorandum either and here again they maintain their former positions.

Furthermore, in the United States and United Kingdom proposals of last year, as in their present proposals, considerable space is devoted to the question of the administration of the international control system. Now, as then, the Western Powers demand the appointment of one principal person in whose hands would be concentrated full authority over the international control system. The only difference is that, whereas previously he was called the "Administrator", now the Western Powers have coyly changed his name to "Executive Officer". But the functions of this Executive Officer are essentially the same as those of the former Administrator. In fact, it is proposed that he should handle all questions connected with the carrying out of obligatory on-site inspection.

But what is proposed in the memorandum of the non-aligned States? We find there only the suggestion for constituting an International Commission, consisting of a number of highly qualified scientists, which would be the basic element of the system for carrying out observation over the fulfilment of an agreement to cease nuclear weapon tests. In the Western Powers' draft, there is also a commission, but it is assigned a much smaller part than the "Executive Officer", also in regard to questions of on-site inspection. What, then, is the "new" draft treaty submitted by the United States and United Kingdom conforming to on this question?

One may well ask: What remains of the eight-Power memorandum? We would say that only odd scraps remain. As is now clear, underlying the "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments" are the old proposals of the Western Powers, rejected as unfeasible in practice.

Therefore this draft treaty cannot be accepted as a basis for working out an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

Now let us take a look at the second draft presented by the United States and the United Kingdom, under the heading "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water" (ENDC/59). It is proposed in this draft to legalize the continuation of underground nuclear explosions. The question arises whether such a proposal could at least to some extent contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and consequently, to lessening the danger of a thermonuclear war. Let us examine the arguments put forward by the United States representative in support of this draft.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Mr. Dean said first that a treaty which would ban nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, but which would not prevent the continuation of underground nuclear tests -- I quote:

"... would result in a definite downward turn in the arms race.

Under such a ban," continued Mr. Dean on 27 August, "... testing of entire weapons systems would be precluded. Testing of weapons to learn how they could be used in battlefield situations would be denied nuclear Powers. Development of ever larger yield warheads for missiles would be stopped" (ENDC/PV.75, p.11).

We must confess that we were somewhat amazed to hear these assertions, as we were when we read them afterwards in the verbatim record. Only ten days ago, at our meeting of 17 August, we heard Mr. Dean say the exact opposite. At that meeting he described in some detail the results militarily which he considered could be achieved with even very small underground tests, let alone big tests of that type. Ten days ago Mr. Dean explained that with underground nuclear tests it was possible to improve, for instance, tactical weapons. Is not the improvement of these weapons one of the important trends of the nuclear arms race? Who can say what difference there is between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons?

Further Mr. Dean said that as a result of even small underground nuclear tests it is possible to achieve:

"development and improvement of the small initiating portion of larger weapons" (ENDC/PV.71, p.20).

Therefore, not only tactical but also larger -- obviously strategic -- nuclear weapons can be improved through underground nuclear explosions.

But that is not all. At the same meeting, Mr. Dean pointed out that with small underground nuclear explosions it is possible to achieve -

"development of basically new weapons as, for example, the pure fusion weapon about which so much has been written and said" (ibid.)

As you see, underground nuclear tests can not only be used for improving existing nuclear weapons, whether tactical or strategic, but also for developing basically new and obviously more devastating and lethal types of weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, Mr. Dean said in the course of the same meeting of 17 August that with small underground nuclear tests it would be possible to ascertain -

"... weapons effects, namely, of the damages caused by shock, blast, X-rays and neutrons" (ibid.).

I must, of course, apologize for having to quote repeatedly, but I think that in order to understand the United States position on this question, it is necessary to quote the statements made by the United States delegation. Consequently, it appears that there is no problem or at any rate hardly any problem in the field of the nuclear arms race which could not be solved by means of underground nuclear explosions.

We gave due attention to the explanation offered by Mr. Dean on 17 August. He is well qualified to give these explanations: no other country has had so much experience of underground nuclear tests as the United States. Since last September alone, more than forty underground nuclear tests in Nevada have been announced, while during the previous series of underground tests the United States detonated underground, according to its own announcements, thirty-two nuclear devices. It is obvious that in view of all this experience, Mr. Dean could well say something on this subject.

Nevertheless, only ten days passed and Mr. Dean began trying to persuade us that in a situation where underground nuclear explosions would continue, it would be possible in some mysterious way to slow down the nuclear weapons race. He says one thing one day and another thing the next, depending, obviously, on what the United States considers to be to its advantage at the particular moment.

If we look at the true situation we cannot ignore the fact that the continuation of underground nuclear weapon tests will certainly not stop the nuclear arms race and, consequently, the threat of a thermonuclear war will only be increased. On 9 September 1961, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, replying to a joint message from President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, concerning the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere only, said:

"Why did the Soviet Government oppose, and why does it continue to oppose, this approach to the problem of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests? The reason is that to agree to discontinue only one sort of test -- in the atmosphere -- would ill serve the cause of peace. Such an agreement would amount to a fraud on the peoples. It could

engender among them the harmful and dangerous illusion that steps were being taken to discontinue the arms race whereas in reality nothing of the kind was being done. In fact, governments would be continuing, so to speak, under legalized arrangements to improve their existing designs of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and for this purpose would be using underground tests, including tests for so-called peaceful purposes, and tests in outer space. Moreover, there would remain the possibility of constructing, on the basis of the data obtained from these experiments, new and yet more destructive types of nuclear weapons. Of course, military circles in the States members of NATO would merely rub their hands with glee, since they very well know that the fulfilment of this plan would bring grist to the mill of the NATO bloc - the potential aggressor."

(GEN/DNT/121, p.3)

This assessment of the situation holds good to this day.

Now let us turn to the second argument put forward by Mr. Dean in support of the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom. He formulated this argument in the following manner:

"... a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans would have an effect on the countries that are about to enter the nuclear arms race. Almost all areas of weapons development and technology, particularly those areas I have just discussed, would be made more difficult for them if these nations became parties to such a treaty." (ENDC/PV.75, p.11)

In other words Mr. Dean was trying to prove that the cessation alone of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, even if underground tests continued, would be sufficient to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. One may well ask the following question: If States retain the possibility of carrying out underground nuclear tests -- if, furthermore, such tests are in a sense legalized -- where are the guarantees that a State which might wish to create its own nuclear weapons would not take advantage of this situation in order to carry out its tests in the underground environment? There is no such guarantee, nor can there be any. On the contrary, the legalization of underground tests would be a stimulus to States desiring to create their own nuclear weapons. Mr. Dean himself explained, as I have just recalled, that all problems connected with the development and improvement of nuclear weapons of any power can be solved by means of underground tests.

Finally, the third argument put forward by Mr. Dean boils down to the following: the draft treaty proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom would

"stop the radioactive pollution of the atmosphere, space, and the oceans." (ibid.)

This is put forward almost as the main argument in support of the proposed draft treaty. It is easy, however, to perceive that by playing on the emotions of simple people, they want to secure the support of public opinion for a plan which is fraught with a tremendous threat to the lives of millions and millions of people. Can anyone have forgotten that the United States bears the responsibility not only for the testing of nuclear weapons but also for the use of such weapons against hundreds of thousands of defenceless inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

The Soviet Government, like the governments of all other peace-loving countries, is concerned at the consequences which may arise in connexion with radioactive fall-out as a result of nuclear weapon tests. This is one of the reasons why it is steadfastly and consistently striving to put an end to all nuclear tests for all time. However, it is impossible not to see that there is a far greater danger in the world today -- the danger of thermonuclear annihilation, especially in view of the fact that the United States is hatching plans for a preventive nuclear war.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, speaking a year ago about this feigned concern of the United States and the United Kingdom at the pollution of the atmosphere, said:

"It would be more honest to tell the peoples what really awaits them if events continue to develop as they have been developing in recent months as a result of the increasing aggressiveness of the NATO Powers' policies. For events are taking such a course that, if the Western Powers' policies are not changed in time, mankind may be caught up in the tornado of a nuclear missile war in which tens and hundreds of millions of people would be incinerated.

"With the NATO Powers' present policy the danger to be feared is no longer radioactive fall-out, but that nuclear weapons themselves, with all their lethal destructive powers, may fall on the head of mankind." (GEN/DNT/121, p.6).

These words were uttered a year ago and are just as valid today.

The threat of a nuclear war cannot be eliminated by legalizing a nuclear armaments race. But what the United States and the United Kingdom are proposing constitutes just such a legalization. How could we agree to accept such a proposal?

We must also draw attention to yet another serious danger with which the United States and the United Kingdom proposal is fraught. This proposal is clearly aimed at securing unilateral military advantages for the Western Powers to the detriment of the defence capability of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

It is well known that for many years the United States has been availing itself of underground tests in order to improve its nuclear weapons. The machinery of underground nuclear tests in the United States is in full swing. It is easy to see that if the United States succeeded in getting underground tests legalized, while at the same time tests in the atmosphere would be banned, this would mean that the United States would be able to go on improving its nuclear weapons and increasing their power and efficiency, whereas the Soviet Union would find its hands bound in regard to the improvement of its own defence capacity. In whose interests is all this? In any case it is not in the interests of strengthening peace, of ensuring the security of peace-loving States and lessening the threat of a nuclear war. We cannot agree to give the United States a virtual monopoly for the improvement of its nuclear armaments. The Soviet Union is in favour of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and the destruction of all stockpiles.

The Soviet Government firmly adheres to the position that it is necessary to reach agreement without delay on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests without exception -- in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground. The thorough discussion which has taken place in the Committee on this question shows with the utmost clearness not only that this problem must be solved but also that it can be solved. Yes, gentlemen, this lies within our power, if all the Governments represented here are prepared to agree to put a stop to the nuclear arms race.

We propose to the Western Powers that we reach agreement to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests in any environment. The Soviet Union is prepared to approach this question from the most constructive standpoint and to take into account all the useful considerations which have been put forward by various delegations in the course of the discussion. Accordingly, we are prepared to envisage distinctions in the nature of a solution which could be adopted immediately -- in regard to tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, on the one hand, and to tests in the bowels of the earth, on the other. It might be possible to reach agreement that all tests

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

are to cease simultaneously -- I stress the word "simultaneously" -- but in regard to nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water the solution would be of a definitive nature, whereas in regard to underground tests it would be in the nature of an understanding which would remain in force until it was replaced by a permanent solution. And in order to find such a permanent solution of the question of the cessation of underground nuclear tests we have a sound basis -- the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States.

Those who stubbornly refuse to take the eight-nation memorandum as the basis for solving the question of putting an end to tests are only complicating the whole matter and demonstrating their unwillingness to seek agreement on a mutually acceptable basis.

Attempts are being made here to convince us that the only way to release the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests from the deadlock is by adopting one of the two proposals of the Western Powers of 27 August. In other words, the Committee is being asked to give up supporting the joint memorandum and to accept as a basis for further negotiations proposals which are radically at variance with that memorandum. No, gentlemen. In the present circumstances the proposals of the eight non-aligned States continue to be the most realistic basis for solving the problem of putting an end to nuclear tests. These proposals provide a way out of the impasse, and the Soviet Union continues to support them.

The Soviet Union also supports other proposals put forward by the representatives of the non-aligned countries with a view to facilitating the settlement of controversial questions. In this connexion it is worth considering the proposal that the nuclear Powers should give an undertaking as from a certain date, say the beginning of January 1963 -- not to carry out any nuclear tests.

The solution to the problem of putting an end to all nuclear weapon tests now depends entirely on the Western Powers. If they finally agree to accept the eight-nation memorandum as the basis in very deed, then the way towards such a solution would be opened.

Mr. CAVALLETI (Italy) (translation from French): I asked to speak this morning to take part in the discussion on item 5(c) of our agenda which began at previous meetings. But before coming to the subject of what I have to say, I should like to tell the Conference about some commentaries published by Pravda on 27 August, that is the day before yesterday, on the subject of a limited agreement on nuclear tests, and the idea put forward in this connexion on 15 August by the Italian delegation (ENDC/PV.70, p.20).

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In Pravda we can read as follows:

"Italy, which in almost everything blindly follows the United States suddenly put forward a proposal for the banning of atmospheric and under water tests. Washington severely reprimanded the Italians, for not only all measures designed to lead to the abolition of tests but even those aimed at limiting them are completely unacceptable to the United States Government. Washington's sharp reproaches disappointed the Italian leaders, who only wished to make themselves useful. The American reaction has shown all countries once again that the United States is opposed and will always be opposed to the efforts of the peoples who wish to put an end to the atomic race. Neither the manoeuvres of United States diplomacy nor Washington's propaganda efforts will succeed in concealing this fact."

This is a translation but I think it corresponds exactly to the Russian.

I did not wish to deprive the Committee of this example of the accurate and faithful reporting of events. Unfortunately for Pravda, this so very truthful report was published on 27 August, the very day on which the United States and United Kingdom delegations submitted here the two draft treaties with which you are familiar and one of which concerns precisely a limited agreement. That is a misfortune which can happen to any newspaper in the world; it is not, therefore, to criticise Pravda, that I have quoted its article, but in the hope that the Soviet Government, whose thinking is usually accurately interpreted by Pravda, will not wish to oppose -- in the expression of its newspaper -- the desire of the peoples who wish to put an end to the atomic race, even if the first step should be a limited agreement.

After the United States and the United Kingdom Governments, in full agreement with the other Western delegations here, had given concrete evidence of their readiness, too, to conclude a limited agreement on tests, if a full agreement is not possible at present, we waited hopefully for the answer of the Soviet Government, confident that it would correspond to the desire expressed by Pravda. Unfortunately, after Mr. Kuznetsov's speech this morning, we are forced to realize that that is not how things are. It was with the gravest concern that we heard Mr. Kuznetsov say this morning that, for the moment, the attitude of the Soviet delegation is contrary to the hopes which the new Anglo-American proposals had aroused throughout the world.

We are deeply disappointed. Faced with the terrible responsibility of a negative reply, the Soviet delegation is now trying to confuse the issue by insisting on the application of the eight Power memorandum, naturally according to its own interpretation. In my opinion, it would be the most serious and striking distortion of the memorandum and an utterly false interpretation of the intention of the non-aligned delegations that the memorandum should be used by the Soviet delegation as a pretext to prevent an agreement which, with the two alternatives proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom delegations, is now possible and easy. I still hope that the negative attitude taken up by the Soviet delegation is not final. I believe that the Soviet Government will not be able to oppose the wishes of its own people of which Pravda has told us.

Moreover, I am quite certain that the Soviet Government will not be able to resist indefinitely the pressure of all those whom Mr. Kuznetsov this morning called "simple people" (supra, p.21), that is to say, all the peoples of the world who will try in the General Assembly of the United Nations to persuade the Soviet Union not to oppose unreasonably and obstinately a first step to nuclear agreements which would be of fundamental importance and of unprecedented moral and political significance and would give a powerful impetus to our negotiations for general and complete disarmament.

Passing now to item 5(c) of our agenda, I should like to say first of all that the Italian delegation has followed with the greatest attention the explanations that the United States and Soviet delegations have given us on this subject. The Italian delegation is glad to note that their respective positions on the problem of conventional weapons have moved a little closer together despite the very considerable divergencies which unquestionably remain.

The Soviet Union's acceptance of a 30 per cent reduction in conventional weapons during the first stage of disarmament is a step forward which the Italian delegation does not underestimate. Moreover, besides being a concession to Western theses, it is a concession to logic. For the Soviet draft treaty, which proposed that the reduction of weapons should be proportionate to the reduction of armed forces (ENDC/2, article 12, para.1), laid down a criterion so vague and indirect that technically it was neither applicable nor defensible.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Welcoming the development of Soviet thinking in this connexion, may I say that it could open the way to an agreement if it was followed to its logical conclusion, namely, if the Soviet delegation did not, at the same time, insist on the 100 per cent abolition of nuclear delivery vehicles. We cannot accept this measure for reasons which we have set forth at length and of which I also spoke at our meeting of 27 August (ENDC/PV.75, p.32). But apart from the reasons of substance, this proposal also raises further special difficulties of detail if it is associated in the same stage with different measures of disarmament for conventional weapons. For if nuclear delivery vehicles were to be subject to a percentage reduction different from that applied to conventional weapons, it would be necessary to work out a definition of nuclear weapons and to draw a line of demarcation between the two. This extremely complicated problem does not arise in applying the United States plan, for this plan adopts the same measures for conventional and for nuclear weapons. It envisages precise lists of weapons which will be destroyed up to 30 per cent during the first stage, whether they are classified as conventional or as nuclear weapons.

The Soviet plan by contrast could not be applied without a prior exact definition of the conventional weapons which, as we know, would be treated differently from nuclear weapons in the first stage. It is very easy to say, as the Soviet delegation has said at recent meetings, that the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons should be based on the criterion that anything which is capable of delivering nuclear weapons is itself a nuclear weapon, without considering whether the same type of weapon can also be used for the delivery of conventional weapons. In fact, by reason of the dual capacity of a very great number of weapons one would, if the Soviet proposal were accepted, have to include all, or practically all, weapons in the first stage, a proposition at variance with any practical possibility and with our agreed principles.

The Italian delegation, as I said before, has always asserted that the mingling in the same stage of total and partial measures of disarmament makes disarmament impossible. Only the application of a reasonable gradualism in all fields can bring us success. In this connexion, I should like to mention the points raised by the Ethiopian representative on 24 August (ENDC/PV.74, pp.14 et s) concerning our method of work. His remarks are somewhat pessimistic, but have a basis of truth. I am less pessimistic than he is but I share his opinion to a considerable extent. What I have just said confirms, in fact, the practical impossibility of including in the

same stage proportionate and total measures, namely, reduction of 30 per cent of some weapons and the total abolition of others.

The recent acceptance by the Soviet delegation of the proportional method, though limited to conventional weapons, shows that the logic of our arguments has had its first success. I hope that our Committee realises the particular necessity, also pointed out by Mr. Alamayegu (ibid. p.20), of accepting as the basis of its work the proportional method which alone conforms to logic, to the practical requirements of a gradual and proportional disarmament, and to our agreed principles.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I should like to devote my remarks today to item 5(c) of document ENDC/52, that is, to the question of conventional weapons. I shall first make a general remark.

Disarmament concerning conventional weapons constitutes one part of general and complete disarmament. This aspect is closely bound up with other measures of disarmament and should have a proper place in the disarmament plan as a whole. This is a basic factor which distinguishes the strategic situation at the present time from what it was in the past. Whereas formerly the reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons might have constituted an important step on the way to abolishing war, today in the era of rockets and nuclear weapons, the question is different.

Today, general and complete disarmament constitutes an indivisible whole. This programme cannot be carried out in isolated parts or in such a way that it is possible to undertake large-scale military action with the most dangerous modern weapons while it is still in progress.

All these factors were taken into consideration by the Soviet Union in its draft treaty. The draft takes account of the fact that in the present arsenals of Powers, conventional weapons constitute an important element, but one supplementing rocket and nuclear weapons. It also takes account of the distribution, throughout Europe and Asia, of United States military bases which do not form part of the United States defence system but are directed against the territories of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries. To this we should add that a considerable part of the armed forces of the United States and its allies are stationed on foreign territory in Europe and outside Europe. That is why the Soviet plan proposes, in the first stage, the total abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles, the liquidation of military bases in foreign territory, the withdrawal of armed forces from the territory of other States and, at the same time, a 30 per cent reduction in conventional weapons and a suitable reduction in the manufacture of these weapons.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

If we compare the measures proposed in the field of conventional weapons by the two plans as modified we note that some common ground has appeared. This is clearly a favourable development. But it cannot disguise from us the picture as a whole.

If we compare all the measures proposed in the two plans for the first stage, we arrive at the conclusion that the United States plan envisages quantitatively a considerably smaller degree of disarmament and, what is more important, this disarmament is qualitatively different.

The Soviet plan proposes removing the principal spearhead of modern armies at the beginning of the disarmament process, that is to say, the destruction of all nuclear weapon vehicles. The 30 per cent reduction of conventional weapons which would be carried out simultaneously with the total abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles would promote the objective of the first stage, that of eliminating the possibility of launching a nuclear war. By contrast, a reduction of conventional weapons linked only to a partial reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles cannot attain this objective. Thus, while the implementation of the Soviet plan would shift the centre of gravity of the national war potentials towards conventional weapons, the implementation of the American proposals would preserve the predominance of rocket and nuclear weapons.

The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, today again tried to present the extensive scope of the measures envisaged for the first stage as a weakness in the Soviet plan (supra, p. 9). We are convinced that in reality the position is quite different. To begin the disarmament process by a complex of decisive and substantial disarmament measures would provide a solid basis for the implementation of subsequent stages and would create a better atmosphere of mutual confidence.

Turning to more detailed considerations, I should like to stress the following.

It is very significant that the United States claims to see in what it calls "across-the-board" reduction of armaments a panacea for all our difficulties. Mr. Dean claims, for example, that the application of this method "best preserves the relative military balance throughout the entire disarmament process" (ENDC/PV.74, p.48). A little later, the United States representative explained why he valued this method so highly. Its application would "keep the pattern of the military machine which each party has chosen to develop." This is the crux of the matter.

We have stressed on many occasions that one of the principal disadvantages of the United States plan was precisely this tendency to maintain, throughout the process of disarmament, an armaments structure which implies a permanent danger of attack

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

by rockets and nuclear weapons. For our part, we are aiming at something which is precisely the opposite, namely to eliminate this danger. And that is where the basis of our divergence lies.

If we compare the Soviet and United States plans in the field of conventional weapons, then, while noting that the attitudes have moved somewhat closer together -- as I have said before -- we cannot help noting nevertheless that the two plans have a different approach to the destruction of conventional weapons during the first stage.

Under article 11 of the Soviet draft, weapons would be destroyed at designated centres and all premises, stores and drill grounds would be transferred to the civilian authorities (ENDC/2, article 11, para.3).

By contrast, the United States draft proposes in sub-paragraph A.2(c) that conventional weapons should first be placed in depots under the supervision of the international disarmament organization (ENDC/30, pp.5-6). The destruction of these armaments would take place only after the lapse of a specified period. The timing of the destruction of the weapons is thus dissociated from the carrying out of the other measures contemplated by the treaty, in particular that of the reduction of forces. This creates conditions possibly favourable to a party which wished, at a convenient moment, to evade its contractual obligations and to resume rearmament.

I should also like to devote a few moments to the problem of the limitation of arms production during the first stage. The question of the cessation, in the first stage, of the production of designated types of weapons and that of the cut-back in the production of other types is of great importance, for what is involved is giving the States parties to the treaty the guarantee that during the process of disarmament the possibility of re-equipping forces with weapons of other types and, primarily of the most dangerous types, will be completely excluded. In keeping with this objective, the Soviet plan introduces in the first stage the total prohibition of the production of nuclear weapon vehicles. Mr. Dean, in his statements of 6 August (ENDC/PV.66) and 22 August (ENDC/PV.73) inquired when, under the Soviet plan, the production of these vehicles should be stopped. Logic alone shows that the production of nuclear weapon vehicles will stop simultaneously with the beginning of the first stage of disarmament, for if at that stage States set about the total abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles, it would be absurd to continue their production.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

Simultaneously with the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons vehicles, article 12 of the Soviet plan proposes, for the first stage, an equivalent reduction in the production of conventional weapons by the closing and dismantling or the conversion to peaceful uses of an equivalent number of enterprises manufacturing these weapons. Can it, then, be said, as Mr. Stelle said today, that the provisions of the Soviet plan for the reduction of arms manufacture are confused?

Analysis of point 3 of section A of the United States plan (ENDC/30, pp.6-7) shows that throughout the first and second stages States would have the possibility of continuing the production of all existing types of conventional weapon, not to mention nuclear weapon vehicles. With regard to production, the United States plan does not establish the principle of the closing, dismantling and elimination of a designated part of war industry enterprises. Surely, we can infer that the reduction in armaments manufacture proposed by the United States would take place through the decrease in the quantity of weapons produced, without the liquidation of the productive installations. And as a result, would not the unemployed productive capacity constitute a potential productive base which could be reactivated?

Although in its latest amendments (sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of document ENDC/30/Add.1) it proposes the prohibition of the production of new types of weapon, the United States plan leaves nonetheless certain loop-holes as regards improvements in existing types of weapon. On 6 August, for example, Mr. Dean stated that States should be allowed to continue current trials of existing weapons to ensure their continuing serviceability (ENDC/PV.66, p.10). This allows the possibility of the technical improvement of existing weapons. Further, the United States plan envisages the possibility of carrying out each year a fixed number of tests with military rockets. All this can lead to an improvement of weapons.

As a result of changes in the two plans, the position of the two parties has also come closer together in the field of the limitation of the production of conventional weapons. But it should, nevertheless, be noted that the concept of the limitation of weapon production under the United States plan remains within

the general idea of maintaining, throughout the disarmament process, the present military structure of States. This would mean that the combat capacity of the essential means of waging war, including nuclear means, would remain intact.

During our discussions the Western delegations have adopted the practice, as each problem is examined, of bringing forward the question of control and of attempting to subordinate all the disarmament measures to control. In doing so, they are generous in their praises of the United States plan of control and inspection by zones. Our remarks offering objective criticism of this plan are presented, on the other hand, as preconceived ideas. For example, on 27 August the Italian representative, Mr. Cavalletti, quoted a passage from my statement (ENDC/PV.75, pp.33-34). Following the method that from time to time has been applied here, he saw fit not to quote the whole of my explanation, from which it is clear that the total verification proposed by the United States signifies the control of weapons remaining at the disposal of States in the zone subject to control. Our criticism, therefore, concerns excessive control within the zone and not the territorial scope of the control.

We hope that the Western Powers will at last give the Soviet project the attention it deserves and will come half-way to meet the constructive attitude of the Socialist countries, so that real progress can be made on the question of general and complete disarmament.

Before concluding, I should like to make one more remark concerning Mr. Cavalletti's last statement concerning the prohibition of nuclear tests and say that the Western delegations are attempting, with too facile arguments, to exploit the hopes of the peoples of the world.

No doubt the hopes of the peoples are fixed on the elimination of the disastrous effects of radioactive fall-out; but as the Soviet representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, stressed today, the hopes of the peoples of the world are above all fixed on the ending of the dangers of the armaments race, on ending the danger of the destruction of millions of human beings, and these hopes can only be realized by the ending of all nuclear tests.

Mr. MALITZA (Romania): The Romanian delegation has paid close attention to the statements made in the course of the meetings held on Monday and today concerning the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Since this is an issue of outstanding importance my delegation sincerely hopes that the nuclear Powers will come to an understanding which will bring an end to all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time. I cannot help noting that, while the Soviet Union is prepared to sign here and now an agreement to stop all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, one of the draft treaties tabled on 27 August in this Committee by the Western Powers proposes the banning of some tests only (ENDC/59). That solution is of such a nature as to give to the remaining category an official, legal and international blessing, encouraging the arms race and stimulating the dissemination of nuclear weapons and nuclear tests. As Mr. Kuznetsov rightly pointed out this morning, what we need, and what the hopes of the peoples are pinned to, is the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. My delegation intends to put forward its views on that issue at one of our future meetings.

I should now like to speak on point 5(c) of document ENDC/52, disarmament measures in regard to conventional armaments, our debate on which has begun in accordance with the procedural provisions adopted on 24 July. We have followed with careful attention the important statements made on this subject during the previous two meetings as well as at this morning's meeting. The Romanian delegation wishes to state its position on some aspects of the problem. As has been rightly pointed out by other delegations, we have here an area where the distance separating the positions has been narrowed down. At the beginning of our work there were two different approaches to the reduction of conventional armaments. One approach, embodied in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, provided for a reduction of armaments corresponding to the reduction of armed forces (ENDC/2 and Add.1). The second approach, embodied in the United States draft treaty outline, provided for a percentage reduction of armaments (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2). The principle lying at the basis of the Soviet approach was a simple and reasonable one corresponding to the task of general and complete disarmament. However, wishing to meet the United States half way, the Soviet

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

Government accepted the United States proposal to proceed to a percentage reduction of conventional armaments and accordingly modified article 11, paragraph 3 of the Soviet draft treaty. Taking into account the desirability of the two parties meeting each other half way, the Romanian delegation welcomed that initiative of the Soviet Government expecting, as many other delegations certainly expected too, that the United States delegation also would take the necessary steps to facilitate an agreement on the main measures to be taken in the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

Although we now have a common approach to the reduction of conventional armaments, the United States outline does not apply it to the entire range of conventional armaments. Within the framework of the United States proposals those armaments are unjustifiably divided into two parts: armaments pertaining to the first category would be subject to a reduction by 30 per cent in the first stage, while those in the second category would remain untouched. Moreover, production of these armaments would go on without any limitation. That would imply the possibility of perfecting them. I do not think it is necessary to stress that, in the present state of modern technology, even a weapon belonging to the small category, if perfected and produced in large quantities, can become capable of assuring an advantage to the State possessing it. May I recall in this connexion the trend towards miniaturization in present-day weapon technology.

The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, again referred to the listed armaments, which of course leaves out the unlisted weapons -- and there is no freezing in the case of these unlisted armaments. Mr. Stelle told us that there would not be any replacement of weapons of the listed categories by bigger armaments, but there remains the possibility of replacing them by smaller weapons which, according to the United States outline, are not subject to reduction in the first stage and might be perfected in a significant manner. Under the system envisaged in the United States plan there is thus the undoubted danger that certain States would secure significant advantages for themselves in the course of the first stage of disarmament by producing and perfecting the types of conventional armaments which are not subject to reduction. We think that a relevant analogy in this respect is with the pocket battleships built in Germany after the First World War. The Soviet proposal does not allow the armaments race to continue in this field, even to the smallest extent, and, equally, does not offer any possibility for any State to acquire military advantages at the expense of other States.

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

How do the Western delegations explain their position? They say that there would be great difficulties in the way of controlling the destruction of so-called small weapons in the first stage. They say also that a vast army of inspectors would be needed, which would create considerable difficulty in the matter of recruitment of the necessary personnel as well as great expense to cover the cost of such a control system. Such objections are groundless. For example, let us suppose that all military aircraft to be destroyed were concentrated in certain depots. We do not believe that a great many more persons would be needed to verify that, besides the aircraft with a given capacity provided for in the United States draft, other aircraft with a smaller capacity also were destroyed. The direct control over the physical destruction of armaments is much easier to achieve, as was pointed out so convincingly by the representative of Sweden, Baron von Platen, at our meeting of 17 August (ENDC/PV.71, p.31). Therefore, there is no objective difficulty in settling this problem. All we need is the determination to settle it. Let us not imitate the men in the story who, while others sought a solution of every difficulty, sought instead difficulties in every solution.

Now I should like to dwell upon the Western Powers' demand that the principle of the percentage reduction should be applied equally to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. According to the United States outline disarmament ought to be a kind of linear process consisting of an across-the-board reduction starting at 100 per cent -- that is, level of armaments at the date of the coming into force of the treaty -- and terminating at zero. Of course, we keep in mind the fact that the United States outline is not consistent with this principle since it does not apply to all types of weapons but allows some of them to increase in numbers during the process of disarmament, while leaving unsettled in the case of others even the question of their liquidation.

At our meeting of 24 August the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, stated:

"First, it remains our belief that in order to maintain balance during disarmament all armaments, both conventional and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, defined by type, should be reduced across the board throughout three clearly defined stages of a treaty. Second, we consider that no meaningful distinctions can be made in practice between what are clearly nuclear delivery vehicles and what are purely conventional armaments." (ENDC/PV.74, p.42.)

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

First of all we note that thus the Western delegations continue their endeavours to confound nuclear weapon delivery vehicles with conventional armaments. The representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, supported their view this morning. But it is unacceptable, not only for technical reasons but for moral and political reasons as well. The stand taken by the Western delegations in this regard does not heed the fact that, together with nuclear weapons themselves, the means of their delivery to targets are part of the greatest danger threatening mankind, namely, the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Nuclear delivery vehicles must not, on any account, be lumped with conventional armaments. Their efficiency, due to the unprecedented power of destruction of nuclear weapons, as well as their wide range, cannot in any case be compared with that of conventional armaments.

At this morning's meeting the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, asserted that nuclear weapon delivery vehicles could not be differentiated from conventional armaments and that there are vehicles not designed for nuclear weapon use which may later show capabilities in that respect. We have already had occasion to point out that our delegation cannot agree with this view and that, as has been made abundantly clear in the course of our debates, from a technical point of view there is nothing to prevent delivery vehicles from being distinguished from conventional armaments.

One might wonder why such arguments are resorted to. Obviously it is in order to justify the refusal of the United States and the other Western Powers to agree to the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I. In this regard I think that it would be proper to recall an episode in the history of disarmament negotiations during the life of the League of Nations. It was in 1932. At that time the United States had proposed, in addition to a series of reductions of usual armaments, the destruction of what it considered to be the most dangerous armaments from the point of view of the maintenance of peace, namely, bomber aircraft. In order to justify opposition to those proposals, at a meeting in 1932 the British representative, Sir John Simon, stated:

"The actual problem is one which cannot be solved completely without considering the case of the civil machine. Even if the Conference were to succeed, by a resolution, in abolishing every military bombing machine, it would still be true not only that it would have to consider how it was to proceed in respect of military machines of great power not designed for bombing" -- and similar words were used by Mr. Stelle today - "but also the possible misuse of large civil machines."

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

I do not think that I need emphasize the similarity, and more than that, the identity between the reasons adduced at that time in order to reject the proposal for the destruction of bomber aircraft, and the arguments used nowadays by the United Kingdom delegation as well as by the United States delegation against the demand of the socialist delegations to liquidate in the very first stage all nuclear delivery vehicles. The failure to agree on the way to distinguish bombers from civil aircraft or from military -- but not bomber -- aircraft was one of the factors which prevented the reaching of an agreement at that time.

The position of my delegation is that stage I must bring to mankind liberation from the greatest danger that has ever threatened it, the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. What is it that causes the present uneasiness in the world? Why is disarmament now the most outstanding issue in international relations? First of all, because there exists the danger of nuclear war. Therefore, in this connexion there can be no room for half measures, partial reductions or gradual approaches. The representative of Italy again today asked for a logical extension of these approaches to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. But what is logical in this case? It is to treat the issue within the framework of its characteristics; and big issues call for decisive steps.

What we need are drastic measures capable, from the very outset, of breaking the backbone of the nuclear rocket system which threatens to destroy entire countries and peoples. For this we may conceive two ways. The first way would be that of liquidating all nuclear weapons, and that is exactly what the Soviet Union was proposing until 1960. The Western Powers refused to go along that road. France asserted that it was the nuclear delivery vehicles which should be eliminated first. That is a second way of wiping out the danger of a nuclear war; without such means of delivery nobody can wage a nuclear war. The socialist States now propose that that way be taken. By the adoption of that measure the danger of a nuclear war would be eliminated.

Another reason invoked by the Western Powers for opposing the liquidation of all nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I is the need to maintain the existing military balance. The representative of Poland has just quoted what Mr. Dean said in that connexion -- that the across-the-board reduction best preserves the relative

(Mr. Halitza, Romania)

military balance throughout the entire disarmament process. And my colleague from Poland, in his outstanding intervention, rightly pointed out the significance of this issue. In fact, what would be preserved throughout the entire disarmament process by maintaining nuclear delivery vehicles as a result of the percentage approach would certainly be the precarious stability, along with its uncertainties and lack of security, which characterizes the prevailing world situation. What would be maintained, not only throughout stage I but during the subsequent stages too, is the danger of nuclear war. The elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles within the framework of stage I simultaneously with the dismantling of foreign military bases as well as the withdrawal of troops from the territories of other nations does not give to any State advantages at the expense of others but assures equal conditions of security for all.

Mr. Dean made frequent references to the idea of military balance. We all know the content and the meaning of the fifth principle set forth in the joint statement of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), but the way in which Mr. Dean is weighing the various measures -- always finding imbalances in every proposal made by socialist countries, whereas his own proposals always seem to result in maintaining balance -- reminds me of the saying of a great American to the effect that scales, in order to be true, should have arms of equal length. It is obvious that Mr. Dean's scales badly need overhauling. How could one explain otherwise that imbalance is found in the Soviet proposals, which in fact meet the basic interests of the United States? To an unprejudiced mind it must be clear that the emergence of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles marked a turning point in the history of the United States -- the transition from the era when the Pacific and the Atlantic constituted its natural defence line to the era when its territory lost that invulnerability. The effect of the proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage is to give back to the United States what the emergence of those means took away from it.

As for the assertion that a certain imbalance would emerge in the European continent, the socialist delegations have proved its inconsistency on numerous occasions. We have shown repeatedly that such an objection is groundless. On the one hand, the level of armed forces would be maintained as far as concerned the European socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, and the European allies of the United States; on the other hand there would be a balance in the conventional armaments of those armed forces, and the man-weapon function is a criterion which cannot be ignored.

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

Actually it is the United States proposals that lead to imbalance. This will emerge clearly if we recall that the United States draft contains no provision with respect to the dismantling of military bases on alien territory: in other words, the proposal runs that while the USSR reduced its nuclear delivery vehicles by 30 per cent the United States would maintain 100 per cent of its military bases on foreign territories from which a nuclear attack could be launched on socialist countries.

Another way whereby the Western Powers' proposals lead to imbalance is to be seen in their approach to the problem of control, which they have enlarged upon so often in past and recent discussions -- substituting it in fact for the problems of substance, that is disarmament measures. As is well known, within the framework of the United States proposal there would be control not only of the 30 per cent reductions but also of the armaments and armed forces remaining at the disposal of States. That would be of a nature to create advantages for a potential aggressor State to the detriment of the security of peace-loving nations.

The system of zonal inspection proposed by the United States delegation runs counter to point 6 of the joint Soviet Union-United States declaration of 20 September 1961 according to which the nature and volume of control should correspond to disarmament measures. The so-called zonal inspection is proportional to disarmament in word only. In reality a total control would be exercised throughout a zone -- that is, over the entire defence system in the area, whatever the extent of disarmament measures might be at a given moment. Applying the information obtained from the inspected area a State having aggressive intentions could very easily determine the defence system of the other State and thus acquire the knowledge necessary to launch an attack.

The representative of Sweden also expressed his doubts as follows:

"... I doubt the advisability of introducing such methods during our very first steps on the road to disarmament as they seem to imply some risk of not fulfilling the criteria dealing with non-divulgence of military secrets ..."

(ENDC/PV.71, p.32).

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

If one wants to ensure the observance of the principle of balance throughout the entire process of disarmament then one must abandon all devices for using inspection and control in such a way as to enable one State to derive military advantage from uncovering the military establishments of another State.

Those are the brief remarks I wished to submit to this Committee concerning the matters now at issue. May I, at the same time, express the hope of the Romanian delegation that conciliatory steps and moves meant to bring the positions closer to each other, as are the proposals of the Soviet Union with regard to the reduction of conventional armaments, will follow from the other side in order to solve the problems of the first stage in accordance with the ardent desires and vital interests of mankind

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): I should like to begin by expressing the pleasure of my delegation at the commendable effort of the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States represented by their two draft treaties (ENDC/58 and 59) on banning nuclear weapon tests which were tabled at our seventy-fifth meeting, on 27 August. I describe the effort of the two delegations as commendable because, by their initiative, the all-important issue of a nuclear test ban is once again being given the consideration it deserves. That issue is a fundamental one which lies at the root of our exercise on general and complete disarmament. Because nuclear explosions constitute naked aggression against humanity my delegation has at all times contended that very little if any progress can in fact be achieved on the general issue of disarmament if we do not first of all secure a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests. It is in that light that my delegation would offer comments on the United Kingdom-United States draft treaties.

Our United States colleague, in introducing those draft treaties, prefaced his remarks with the following words:

"In the interest of humanity and of generations yet unborn, the United States earnestly seeks a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which will ban all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time." (ENDC/PV.75, p.5).

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

Mr. Dean went on to ask a question and then to answer it himself, as follows:

"What are we trying to stop? We are trying to stop the destruction of the human race and historical values. If we do not stop testing altogether, we may stop human progress altogether. So let us move forward about our business." (ibid.)

Those are solemn words -- words which, if carefully weighed, are bound to leave us much food for thought.

In this connexion I should like to refer to what Mr. Lachs -- our Polish colleague who has now returned home -- said on 15 August:

"Many words have been used in this Committee; sometimes people get used to them so that they do not even react. There is a danger of inflation of words, but certain words, though many times used, retain their value and force."

(ENDC/PV.70, p.15)

Those remarks by Mr. Lachs are appropriate in describing Mr. Dean's words at our seventy-fifth meeting. It is in that context that I should like to offer my comments on the draft treaties proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 20 August the representative of India, Mr. Lall, speaking on a nuclear test ban, had this to say:

"... I feel it is germane to stress that in pressing for a test ban we have not been thinking only of the nuclear Powers but also of ourselves, of our freedom from fall-out, and of our freedom from the threat of the extension of this dread disease of testing to other States. Therefore, we have and have had our own interests very much in view in addressing ourselves to this matter; and the eight-nation memorandum must be regarded as directly and intrinsically realistic because it concerns and takes into account our own well-being, our own need for an end to the cold war. And, indeed, in this respect our need is much more pressing than the needs of the nuclear Powers themselves."

(ENDC/PV.72, p.16)

Our need to see an early end to the cold war is great and it transcends all ideological values. It is becoming obvious every day that mankind is involved in a common fate with the existence of nuclear weapons, and it is illusory for anyone to continue to imagine that profound ideological distrust -- or what I might call pathological phobia -- can still divide the world. This is the supreme moment for the two blocs to close ranks, whatever may be their ideological differences.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

My delegation believes that the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) provides the best common basis for reaching a workable agreement banning all nuclear tests in all environments. It believes, therefore, that in considering the practicability or otherwise of the first draft treaty proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States full cognizance ought to be taken of the eight-Power memorandum.

I should now like to turn to the second draft treaty (ENDC/59). It is indeed an important document, but in considering it many issues come to mind. It marks a conspicuous advance on the part of the two Western delegations towards solving the question of a test ban. What are the chances of this draft treaty being accepted? I would say the chances are fair if other kindred considerations are also taken along with it.

On 27 August our colleague from the Soviet Union made preliminary comments on the second draft treaty, and perhaps I might say that my remarks here relate materially to those preliminary comments. I have not had time to study or to digest what was said by Mr. Kuznetsov this morning. My initial reaction, however, is that his detailed and formal statement seemed aimed at elaborating on those earlier remarks of his, so that I feel my own remarks would not necessarily be out of place should they be applied to his remarks in general. On 27 August Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"The second document, as far as I can come to a preliminary conclusion from a rapid perusal of it, is aimed at virtually legalizing underground nuclear weapon tests." (ENDC/PV.75, p.35)

And he went on to say:

"If underground tests are not prohibited, the threat of thermo-nuclear war being unleashed will continue to hang over mankind." (ibid.)

Although the Soviet Union representative did not in his preliminary remarks reject outright the idea of a partial test ban, it would seem he is somehow concerned that there ought also to be some form of prohibition of underground nuclear tests. I hope he will tell the Committee a little more about the sort of prohibition he had in mind with regard to this type of nuclear tests.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

On the other hand, one is constrained to feeling that the proposal submitted by the Soviet Government on 28 November 1961 on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests might well be inferred from Mr. Kuznetsov's preliminary remarks. What did that Soviet Government proposal say on the question of a partial tests ban? It invited the Western Powers:

"... to conclude immediately an appropriate agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space ... "

(ENDC/11, p.5)

The cessation of the first of these three types of nuclear tests, namely atmospheric tests, was of course first proposed by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in their joint statement dated 3 September 1961 (GEN/DNT/120).

But the Soviet Government proposal of 28 November 1961 contained another important provision. It stated:

"In regard to underground nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Government is of the opinion that States should undertake not to conduct such tests until agreement is reached on a system of control over underground explosions as a constituent part of an international system of control over the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament."

Thus, the Soviet Government document envisages two things in the paragraph which I have just quoted. First, it seeks to place a ban on or to prohibit underground tests until agreement is reached. And, secondly, it envisages that any such agreement must be reached within the framework of an international control system which is linked with general and complete disarmament. Here is the crux of the issue.

I sincerely hope that our Soviet colleague will note that the stand of his Government on a nuclear tests ban as part and parcel of a system of control on disarmament now appears untenable because the nuclear tests issue is now more or less accepted as our number one priority towards general and complete disarmament. We must give consideration to what can be done about underground tests in the -- as I very sincerely hope -- likely event of our reaching agreement on a partial test ban treaty.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

This consideration demands that the nuclear Powers do something about underground tests whilst negotiating for a total test ban. This question, I submit, admits of one possibility: a moratorium -- call it voluntary, call it partial, if you wish -- must also be reached by the nuclear Powers on underground tests, pending the final agreement banning all tests. There are compelling reasons why we must seek to secure a moratorium on underground tests whilst at the same time agreeing on a partial ban treaty.

What are those compelling reasons which call for a moratorium on underground tests? Here I must quote extracts from what the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, told us on 17 August about underground tests. These are his words:

"As a few specific illustrations of the developments that can be made with small -- and, indeed, very small -- underground explosions, I would enumerate the following:

1. development and testing of tactical weapons;
 2. development and improvement of the small initiating portion of larger weapons;
 3. tests of weapons effects, namely, of the damages caused by shock, blast, X-rays and neutrons;
 4. development of basically new weapons as, for example, the pure fusion weapon about which so much has been written and said.
- "This fusion weapon may be developed from very small underground nuclear explosions." (ENDC/PV.71, p.20)

If those are a few of the things that can be achieved by underground tests, then we plead with the nuclear Powers to share our concern and agree on a moratorium on these tests capable of perfecting weapons of unparalleled mass annihilation. Short of the reaching of agreement on an immediate test ban treaty, only a moratorium on underground tests by the nuclear Powers would decrease the likelihood of other nations entering into this unholy competition. Something ought to be done, Mr. Chairman, to counter "the threat of the extension of this dread disease of testing to other States", if I may borrow the words of my Indian colleague, Mr. Lall.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

My delegation has always stood for a moratorium on all nuclear tests, even before the idea of a partial tests ban became infectious like an epidemic. That was clearly evident in my speech at our meeting on 27 July. I now quote extracts from that speech. These were my words:

"My Government would therefore be happy if a moratorium of some kind banning tests were agreed upon by the nuclear Powers pending the conclusion of a lasting agreement." (ENDC/PV.62, p.8)

If my construction of his remarks on 27 August is correct, I would say that my demand for a moratorium on underground tests is shared also by the leader of the Indian delegation, who said then:

"We perfectly understand the difficulty that some countries have in accepting anything like a moratorium. But, trying to think aloud on this important matter -- if I may be pardoned for doing so -- I would emphasize that it might be possible for countries, for governments, to agree to exercise self-restraint in this matter, self-restraint which would bring dividends by increasing confidence and trust on both sides. Is that too much to hope for -- that without fanfare, without any special conditions, the countries concerned could exercise self-restraint in the interest of creating an atmosphere for further negotiations and for bringing to an end all nuclear weapon tests; and also to create an atmosphere which would be beneficial to further agreement on disarmament?" (ENDC/PV.75, p.54)

I am sure it is not asking too much to request the nuclear Powers to give serious consideration to the question of a moratorium on underground tests besides agreeing on a partial treaty on a test ban. I sincerely hope that fears that a moratorium on underground tests is open to easy breach or easy cheating because such tests could not at present be detected should not deter the nuclear Powers from giving it a trial. Whatever the risks may be, the danger of competition is less and the fear of non-nuclear nations joining the race reduced. It is a hard choice, but let us try it.

The nuclear Powers owe mankind a great obligation. That obligation which they owe demands a choice of risks. It is inescapable. It is imperative. The nuclear Powers must, therefore, choose that risk which promises best to break the present impasse and secure a partial tests ban treaty which will eventually pave the way for general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

In conclusion I wish to express the hope that the sponsors of the draft treaty on a partial test ban (ENDC/59) will offer us some explanation of what is envisaged within the context of its article 2 when they speak of explosions for peaceful purposes. To non-experts like myself it seems frightfully difficult to make a dichotomy between what constitutes explosions for peaceful purposes and what does not.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico): I should like to ask the opinion of members of the Committee their opinion about whether we should go on at this time to hear the other speakers whose names I have on my list. There are six, and in addition two delegations have asked to be allowed to exercise the right of reply. In view of the hour, and if there is no objection from any of the speakers listed for today, I would suggest that we hear now the two delegations that wish to exercise the right of reply, leaving the other speakers on the list for our next meeting. Does any of the delegations inscribed for today wish to speak now?

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I understand that there is also a long list of speakers inscribed for Friday, including the Canadian delegation. Before this meeting opened there were, I believe, two other speakers inscribed in addition to those who have spoken. If today's list is carried forward, with the inclusion of speakers who have added their names since this meeting opened, it will mean that the representatives on the list for Friday will be displaced. I would have no objection if the two representatives whose names were on the list this morning, but who have not spoken, were to be carried forward on the list and to be the first to be heard on Friday, but I would suggest that representatives who have inscribed their names since the beginning of this meeting should be listed for Friday after those who had already previously placed their names on the Friday list. I hope this suggestion is not too complicated.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico): I think that what the representative of Canada has stated is clear. I must point out that only one more speaker has been added to the list apart from the two who have asked to be allowed to exercise the right of reply. Therefore, if we do not proceed with our list of speakers today --

(The Chairman, Mexico)

to cover the point raised by the representative of Canada -- all those that are listed to speak at the next meeting were already on the list at the beginning of this meeting, with the exception of the representative of Sweden, whose name was added to the list later. Does any of the delegations which was on the list at the beginning of this meeting wish to speak now?

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I do not think my delegation was listed at the beginning of the meeting. The name of my delegation was added later. So I will not insist on speaking today. My intervention would, in any case, be a very brief one concerning the cessation of all nuclear tests. Of course I shall be bound by any decision you take as to the best time for the delivery of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico): In that case I shall give the floor to the two delegations that wish to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): My delegation will want to study and reply later in detail to the disappointing and disquieting statement we heard today from the representative of the Soviet Union. There are, however, a few points which I believe must be made briefly at this time.

With regard to the comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58), the treaty banning tests in all environments, which the United States and the United Kingdom submitted at our meeting on 27 August, the main burden of Mr. Kuznetsov's comments seemed to be that this proposal represented no change in the United States and United Kingdom position. It seems to me that a comment of this character is singularly inappropriate, coming as it does from the representative of the Soviet Union. The stark contrast between the retrograde movements of the Soviet Union in the negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty and the forward movements of the United States and the United Kingdom is clear for all to see.

I will not go into history, but all of us know, and all the world knows, that in March 1961 the United States and the United Kingdom came back to the test ban Conference with carefully worked out proposals (GEN/DNT/PV.274, pp.16 et seq.) which formed the basis for our later draft treaty (ENDC/9) of 18 April 1961,

(Mr. Stelle, United States of America)

proposals which were calculated to meet the objections which the Soviet Union before then had posed to our proposals. We were met at the first meeting of that reconvened Conference with a major retrograde movement on the part of the Soviet Union: the new Soviet demand for a tripartite administration -- the so-called troika administration -- a demand which, if granted, would have inserted into every detail of the daily operation of the control system a built-in Soviet veto. In spite of that fact, the Western delegations during the summer of 1961 made still further proposals calculated to meet Soviet objections. Those proposals were met at the end of that summer by the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the Soviet Union, against its declared word. And when we next met in that Conference the Soviet Union brutally discarded the whole basis of our negotiations, the agreed basis on which we had been working for three years, the agreement (EXP/NUC/28) reached by scientific experts, including those of the Soviet Union, in the summer of 1958, the agreement which had been endorsed by governments, including those of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. I am referring, of course, to the Soviet proposals of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11).

Despite lip service to the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28), the Soviet Union, in its interpretation of that memorandum, has not changed one whit its position of 28 November 1961. And the Soviet representative says that the United States and United Kingdom proposals and draft treaty for a comprehensive agreement (ENDC/58) represent no change. That statement, of course, is completely inaccurate. Those new proposals which we have tabled in the form of a treaty are proposals which we have been enabled to make because of our recent scientific research, and they have been made taking careful account of the suggestions put forward by members of this Committee, including those who participated in the drafting of the eight-nation memorandum.

I do not need to go into any detail on what the major moves are as represented in the draft treaty which we tabled on Monday. We continue, of course, to insist on obligatory on-site inspection, and we believe that this insistence is justified and supported by our reading of the eight nation memorandum. But we have said that if the Soviet Union will accept clearly and unequivocally the obligation to

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

facilitate on-site inspection we will consider reducing the number of inspections, the annual quota of inspections of events certified by the commission, below what we have previously proposed. And if representatives read the treaty with care they will see that important changes have been allowed for in the composition of the inspection teams. We have made a major move in ceasing to demand internationally manned and internationally operated control posts, and have accepted the idea of placing major reliance on nationally manned and nationally operated control posts, given adequate supervision by the international scientific commission. Further, we have said that the number of such posts would be considerably reduced even below what the Soviet Union had previously agreed to for a world-wide system.

Our new proposals obviously provide for a greatly simplified international scientific commission, headquarters and staff as compared with our previous proposals. There is no truth in the allegation that the United States and United Kingdom comprehensive draft treaty represents no change from previous positions.

With regard to the alternative treaty, the partial treaty (ENDC/59), Mr. Kuznetsov claimed that it was not acceptable unless underground tests were not continued, and in doing so he laid major stress on the military importance of underground tests, adducing statements made here by the leader of the United States delegation. Now, it is quite true that underground tests are of real military importance. You cannot do all things underground, you cannot test in the megaton range, you have difficulty testing anti-missile missiles, but there is real military importance in underground tests: that is an accurate statement. But it is for that very reason that we cannot accept a comprehensive treaty including an obligation not to test underground without on-site inspection to see that the obligation is actually being observed. And it is for the same reason that we cannot in a partial treaty accept a moratorium in any guise on underground tests. That is one of the reasons for which we cannot accept a moratorium. The other is the really very important principle agreed to by the Soviet Union in paragraph 6 of the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5), which says that:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations."

We will not set such an unfortunate precedent for all future disarmament negotiations as the acceptance of an obligation which was not subject to effective control would constitute.

It seems to me that the position is very clear. If the Soviet Union will not accept a partial treaty with obligations not to test in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space, but with no provisions with regard to underground testing, then it has a simple choice. It can pay the small price of a few on-site inspections a year, and there will be little difficulty in reaching agreement -- an agreement which we would prefer -- on a comprehensive treaty banning tests in all environments, including tests underground.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): In view of the time I will speak only very briefly. I asked for the right of reply because I felt it necessary to record my reaction to the speech we listened to this morning from the representative of the Soviet Union. I agree entirely with what has just been said by my United States colleague, and I would say that I found it an incredible experience to listen this morning to what appeared to be a brusque rejection of the new treaty texts which the two Western delegations put forward as recently as Monday. Those texts were put forward after tremendously careful consideration; they are detailed and precise, and they deserve detailed and precise consideration. To reject them in such a hasty manner seems to me to be nothing less than an insult to this Conference, and I think this Conference should say to our Soviet colleague that it will not accept a rejection in such terms, prepared before his Government could possibly have had an opportunity of giving the texts serious and considered study. I say to him, "Go back to Moscow with those proposals and get fresh instructions in relation to them", because those proposals do represent a very big step forward.

Our Soviet colleague put forward today a list of arguments, all of which we have heard before, all of which are very unconvincing. Indeed he almost followed the prediction which I felt bound to make on Monday (ENDC/PV.75, p.20) when I

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

reminded the Conference that on previous occasions so often the reply to a new move from the West has been that it is not new. Well, we heard it again this morning; in graphic phrases our Soviet colleague talked about attempts made to paint the old position in a new form, "to put a new dress on the same old girl" -- I think those were his words. In fact that is not true. The truth is that this is a new position, and it marks a substantial advance on the part of the West. It deserves a better reception than it has so far received.

I am not going to go through all the arguments at this point, but I would pick up here one particular argument which I thought I had replied to effectively enough yesterday at our Sub-Committee and was surprised to hear it advanced again -- the idea that in the partial treaty we have proposed we are in fact legalizing underground tests. With very great respect, that argument seems to me to be nothing but arrant nonsense; I really cannot see any justification whatever for it. We have these four environments; if we prohibit testing in three it by no means makes the position of the fourth any more right. Indeed logically it would provide a greater degree of world opinion against testing in the fourth environment. Surely that is something to the good, and surely it is nonsense to say simply because we are only going part of the way that the fourth environment is being sanctified or legalized. I cannot accept that as a sound and reasonable argument. Of course, as my United States colleague made so clear a moment ago, if in fact the Soviet Union does not want this partial treaty it is so easy for it to have a complete one, and what we ask in return for it is only a very minimum of on-site inspection.

So I do say to our Soviet colleague that really the reaction we have had today, while it is serious indeed, is not one which we can accept as a final reply to our proposals. Those proposals have been put forward with the very greatest care and thought and they do represent a very real new position. They deserve better than to be rejected within forty-eight hours.

But it is important to get the position quite clear in the minds of our colleagues. And after listening to the representative of Nigeria I think it is very important. We naturally listened to what he said with the greatest respect, but I can only reiterate what my United States colleague said here: that it would not be right to ask the West to accept a moratorium in these circumstances when the

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

alternative which the Soviet Union could accept is so simple. If it does not wish underground tests to be carried on there is this alternative in our comprehensive treaty. When one remembers what happened just about a year ago -- when suddenly, without warning, when apparently it was negotiating in good faith, the Soviet Union started a massive series of tests -- to ask us to accept a moratorium now would in my view be quite unreasonable. As I said before, once bitten twice shy, and I say it again today as indicating the true way in which the situation should be looked at.

I assess the present position in this way. After our new offers on Monday the only real basic differences that stand between the world and a nuclear test ban treaty are as follows. On the one hand there can be a permanent ban agreed on at once on nuclear tests in the higher atmosphere, at higher altitudes, and under water without any on-site inspection, if the Soviet Union will agree to this while negotiations continue for a ban in the fourth environment. On the other hand, there can be a permanent ban in all environments if the Soviet Union will agree while research goes on to make any on-site inspection unnecessary; if it will agree, for the time being there may be no more than a double handful of on-site inspections a year chosen from unidentified events specified by the international commission. And I would remind the Committee that the United States and the United Kingdom are continuing their research on eliminating any need for on-site inspection. So again, if the Soviet Union would join us in that, that day would be brought nearer.

We are very near an agreement here, it seems to me. These are the simple facts. The arguments which we heard from our Soviet colleague this morning were wholly outside the realm of the new position we have put forward; the same reiteration of those old outworn arguments is not a justification for turning down the position we have put forward. These are in fact the simple facts of the case.

Our Soviet colleague sometimes does us the honour of quoting British newspapers to us. Perhaps I could quote just one sentence from one of yesterday's British newspapers because I think it sums it up. In talking of the Soviet Union's immediate reaction to our proposals, it said:

"What can we think when half the agreement is rejected because it is not the whole and the whole agreement is rejected because it might prove effective?"

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

That is really the position, and I hope very much that our Soviet colleague will go back again and that his Government will give him authority to come some way to meet us. We have made so many advances towards the Soviet Union. If it will not make any advance towards us, is it surprising if we come to the conclusion that its whole negotiating position is nothing but a colossal hollow sham? I hope it is not that. It is for the Soviet Union to show us that indeed it is not.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I consider it necessary to make a few brief comments on the replies which we have just heard from the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom.

It is not the first time that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried to shift on to the Soviet Union the responsibility for the lack so far of an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapon tests. I think that this attempt to blame someone else for one's own fault is not likely to help us towards finding ways and means of resolving the existing controversial questions.

I shall not go into the background of this question in detail. We have repeatedly reported and stated here in the Committee how the situation was shaping in the Three-Power Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and who was responsible for it. The responsibility for the fact that we still have no agreement undoubtedly lies with the Western Powers. I would simply remind you of one small detail from the background of this question.

As you know, a favourable situation was taking shape for the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests soon after the Geneva negotiations started in 1958. But when, as the saying goes, agreement was just around the corner and there appeared to be few remaining unsettled questions, the United States suddenly put forward new demands which practically called in question the whole of the work carried out by the experts in the summer of 1958. The United States Government then went to a good deal of trouble to discredit these recommendations. Its representatives insisted above all that the system of control over underground explosions worked out by the experts in 1958 was inadequate.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Basing itself on this far-fetched conclusion, the United States first demanded that all provisions dealing with the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests should be excluded from the treaty, and then, as you know, numerous discussions were started and, as one might say, the merry-go-round of this absolutely useless work went round and round. As a result, we are still without a treaty.

Further, I should like to draw attention to the statement made by the United Kingdom representative. Mr. Godber frequently assumes here the role of a lecturer, if I may say so, who would like to give lessons on good manners to others, lessons on how they should speak and lessons on what language they should use. I should like to draw your attention to the fact that Mr. Godber is nervous today. But in this case I think the proverb applies: "Jupiter is angry; that means he is in the wrong". I should like to draw the attention of the United Kingdom representative to the intolerable expressions he used. On what grounds does he consider that the Soviet delegation cannot express its views on any question, and who gave him the right to say whether the Soviet delegation should state its views today or wait another few days? I think that such an approach to the work shows that the United Kingdom representative still has, apparently, such approaches to the work as are quite out of place in a Committee composed of fully sovereign States.

In this connexion, I consider it intolerable that he should say that the Soviet delegation had insulted the Committee. I request it to be put on record that such an expression cannot be allowed in regard to a delegation stating its views on such an important and vital question.

I turn now to the substance of his comments. When dealing with this subject, the United Kingdom representative very frequently dishes up the same old question, although this expression may not be a very polite one. The question is this: Why has the Soviet delegation not kept to the position it occupied three years ago? Why should it not take into account those changes and advances which are taking place in the world, and why should it continue to adhere to the positions which it occupied three years ago? I understand Mr. Godber, and I realise that in the United Kingdom and in some other Western countries, there are still many statesmen who would like to turn back the world situation not only to what it was three years ago, but probably to that which existed, say, forty or fifty years ago. But I am afraid, Mr. Godber,

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

that I cannot help you. History has its own inexorable laws, and the historical processes which are going on cannot be arrested by any arguments or repetitions. Therefore, the only thing I can advise Mr. Godber to do is to find the time and the courage to analyse what is happening in the world and to act accordingly. I am certain that he would then not go on repeating that we should revert to the position of three years ago, or perhaps even further back.

Now I should like to quote a short extract from The Times of 28 August. This short passage has a direct bearing on the question under discussion here. It comes from a leading article headed "Putting Russia to the Test". I shall read out the last two sentences referring to the idea of a moratorium, to the idea that the nuclear States should assume the obligation not to carry out nuclear weapon tests. Here is the quotation:

"These are not a major threat. The danger to the deterrent balance lies now in large atmospheric tests which would give a breakthrough to the anti-missile missile. Besides, the distinguishing of all underground tests will probably be possible in a matter of months".

It goes on to say that the assumption of such an obligation would not entail any danger to the Western Powers either. So you see, Mr. Godber, that the idea of the nuclear Powers assuming an obligation not to carry out any tests is not a new one. It has not been invented by the Soviet delegation, and it finds considerable support in the country which you represent here.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its seventy-sixth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo, representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Italy, Poland, Romania, Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 31 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.